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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
tinction between a statute which through a presumption altered the rules
of evidence or shifted the burden of proof to the defendant and one
which by definition destroyed the defense of lack of knowledge or par-
ticipation in the crime; but the latter would appear even more violative
of rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 22
By applying Justice Cardozo's test of balancing the convenience to
the public against the hardship on the individual defendant,23 it can be
argued that the rule permitting a principal to be held for the conduct
of his employees, even though he did not participate in and did not
know of the crime, should be limited to minor offenses involving the
imposition of small fines. With many other regulatory devises available,
there would appear to be no social need for subjecting a morally innocent
principal to the risk of a jail sentence. But where the legislature deter-
mines that heavy penalties are required, the courts should insist on the
right of the principal to establish his innocence by proving that he did
not know and could not reasonably be expected to know the facts which
constituted the alleged crime. Such a formula would recognize the re-
quirements of administration while maintaining constitutional notions of
criminal justice.24
PETE A. DAMMANN
Admissibility of Confessions in the Federal Courts and the
Hobbs Bill
The Hobbs bill' is designed, according to its author,2 to "correct" the
rule of the McNabb case3 as to admissibility of confessions in evidence.
That rule, as originally propounded, made a confession taken by federal
officers, prior to a deliberately delayed arraignment of a person appre-
hended for the commission of a crime, inadmissible in evidence. The deci-
sion was not based upon the constitutional ground of a violation of due
process,4 but upon the power of the United States Supreme Court to
supervise the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.5
22 Cardoio, J. in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 324 (1937).
23 Morrison v. California, op. cit. supra Note 21.
24 Similar suggestion in Sayer, Public Welfare Offenses (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev.
55, 79; note (1943) 19 Ind. L. J. 265. See dissent in Ez parte Marley, .... Cal.
175 P. (2d) 832, 836, 837 (1946).
1 Designated as H.R. No. 4, 1st Session 80th Congress.
2 Representative Hobbs of Alabama.
-3 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); An Internal Revenue Depart-
ment Agent was killed in a raid on moonshiners, and the McNabb brothers were
apprehended for the crime. Conviction was obtained largely on the basis of the
confessions in question. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the con-
fessions were inadmissible in evidence. On retrial of the case, it was found that
the McNabbs had in fact been duly arraigned, and they were then convicted.
McNabb v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 904 (C.C.A. 6th, 1944). In his dissenting
opinion in the first McNabb case, Mr. Justice Reed pointed out that the record did
not show failure to arraign, nor did counsel raise the issue. 318 U. S. 332, 349
(1943).
4 See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lisbenda v. California, 314
U.S. 219 (1942).
5 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
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The application of the rule is limited, therefore, to federal cases and to
federal officers.
One of the manifestations of disapproval of the McNabb decision 6 was
the first attempt to pass the Hobbs bill, in the 78th Congress. 7 The pres-
ent bill, which recently died in the Senate Judiciary Committee, is sub-
stantially the same as the one which has thrice passed the House but has
thus far failed to pass the Senate. 8 It provides that a failure to observe
the requirements of law as to the time within which a person under arrest
must be brought before a committing officer shall not render inadmissible
any evidence otherwise admissible. The intention was obviously to negate
specifically the rule of the McNabb case, and to confine the question of
admissibility to its previous status.9 .
In the hearings on the bill before the House Committee, there was a
lengthy discussion of the repercussion of the McNabb case rule on law
enforcement problems. 10 Police officials throughout the federal system
claimed to be seriously hampered in the performance of their duties.
There were many instances in the lower federal courts of releases of
accused persons, even though they had made confessions which would
ordinarily have been admissible, but which did not meet the requirements
of the McNabb case." In some federal courts, however, the McNabb case
rule was held to be limited quite closely to the particular facts of that
case and was not followed in similar situations.' 2
While at the time of its, introduction the Hobbs bill would haye effec-
tively removed these difficulties by nullifying the effect of the McNabb
decision, the Supreme Court since then has apparently obviated the need
for remedial legislation by its modification of the McNabb case rule in
United States v. Mitchell.13 There the Court phrased the rule of the
McNabb case to stand for the proposition that the illegal detention of an
accused person will invalidate his confession only when the detention
itself acts as an inducement in the procuring of the confession.' 4 Seem-
ingly the voluntariness of the confession would thereby be destroyed and
6 A rule to the same effect as the Hobbs Bill was originally incorporated in the
preliminary draft of the proposed. federal rules of criminal procedure, but after
being subjected to adverse criticism, was dropped. Holtzoff, Proposed Rules of
Criminal Procedure, (1943) 3 F.R.D. 420; Cummings, The Third Great Adventure,
(1943) 3 F.R.D. 283.
7 H.R. No. 3690, 78th Cong. (1st Sess.). The bill met lively opposition on the
House floor. The principal objection expressed was that the bill, indirectly auth-
orized violations of the extant federal arraignment statutes. Several representatives
argued that such legislation would tend to break down those requirements and
sanction the use of "third degree" methods of interrogation. 80 Cong. Rec. Febru-
ary 24, 1947, at 1430 et seq.
8 Passed House, 80 Cong. Re., Feb. 24, 1947 at 1440. Referred to Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 80 Cong. eec., Feb. 26, 1947 at 1476.
9 See infra note 15.
10. Hearings before Sub-Committee No. 2, of the Hquse Committee on. the Judiciary
on H.R. 1N6. 3690, Ser. No. 12 (1944).
11 Gros v. United States, 136 F. (2d) 878 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943); United States v.
Haupt, 136 F. (2d) 661 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943).
12 United States v. Grote, 140 F. (2d) 413 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944); United States v.
Keegan et al., 141 F. (2d) 248 iC.C.A. 2d, 1944).




its admissibility would be open to due process objections, which would of
course override any statutory sanction.15
Mr. Justice Reed's interpretation of the revised McNabb case rule, as
expressed in his concurring opinion in the Mitchell case, is that a confes-
sion is made inadmissible by illegal detention and other improper conduct
"even though the detention plus the conduct do not together amount to
duress or coercion. "16 This would mean, then, that something less than a
due process violation is still sufficient to prevent the admission of a con-
fession in federal cases. The present rule, therefore, seems to represent
a compromise between the basic due process test and the original McNabb
case principle. Apparently it would be unaffected by the Hobbs bill,
which was designed primarily to nullify the McNabb case rule, and not
necessarily to force the Court back to the due process test.
The problem underlying the opposing views of the original McNabb
case rule and the Hobbs bill is one of reconciling the interest of the indi-
vidual in security from inquisitorial methods of criminal investigation
with the public interest in effective methods of apprehension and prose-
cution of criminals. While the individual should have the benefit ofa
prompt arraignment, efficient law enforcement necessitates a reasonable
period of interrogation of a suspected criminal prior to the making of
formal charges. 17
The "Uniform Arrest Act' 18 suggests a solution to the problem thus
posed. This proposal would permit law enforcement officers a period in
which to question suspects before their arraignment, and, at the same
time, enable courts to exercise some supervision over their activities, by
requiring close adherence to the prescribed periods of custody. Another
possible solution would be the partial adoption of the system employed
in England. There the judges of the King's Bench prescribe rules for
the custody and interrogation of suspects, and thus closely supervise this
phase of the criminal process. 19 The Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 20 while removing the previous conflict among federal statutes as
to time of arraignment, 21 have not solved this basic problem.
15 Prior to the McNabb case, the rule as to admissions of confessions in evidence
was to the effect that, if an accused was induced to confess by the infliction or
threat of physical suffering, or by threats or promises which were likely to cause him
to make a false statement, the confession was not admissible. Wilson v. United
States, 162 U. S. 613 (1895). Similarly, circumstances of prolonged questioning and
detention have been held to be so coercive as to invalidate confessions. White v.
Texas, 310 U. S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) ; Wigmore,
Evidence, (3rd ed. 1940) §882. These tests of constitutionality also applied to cases
appealed from state courts on due process grounds. See Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322
U. S. 143 (1944); (accused questioned almost continuously for 36 hours. Question-
ing held inherently coercive and therefore violative of the Fourteenth Amendment).
16 322 U. S. 65, 71.
17 Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof (3rd ed. 1937) §276.
18 The Uniform Act, proposed by The Interstate Commission on Crime, has been
adopted by two states, Rhode Island and New Hampshire. R. I. Pub. Laws 1941,
c. 982; N. H. Laws 1941, c. 163. Discussed in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act,
(1942) 28 Va. L. Rev. 315.
19 Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure, March 16,
1929, Cmd.,3297; Mc Cormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility
of Confessions, (1946) 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239.
20 5 F. R. D. 573 (1946).
21 Rule 5(a), 5 F. R. D. 581 (1946).
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